In the late nineteenth century, the United States imposed high tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. This paper examines the magnitude of protection given to import-competing producers and the costs imposed on export-oriented producers by focusing on changes in the domestic prices of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. Because the tariffs tended to increase the prices of non-traded goods, the degree of protection was much less than indicated by nominal rates of protection; the results here suggest that the 30 percent average tariff on imports yielded about a 17 percent implicit subsidy to import-competing producers while effectively taxing exporters at a rate of about 10 percent. The paper also finds that tariff policy redistributed large amounts of income (about 8 percent of GDP) across groups, although the impact on consumers was only slightly negative because they devoted a sizeable share of their expenditures to exportable goods. These findings may explain why import-competing producers pressed for even greater protection in the face of already high tariffs and why consumers (as voters) did not strongly oppose the policy.
Introduction
For most of the nineteenth century, the United States exported raw materials and food (cotton and tobacco from the South and wheat and corn from the Midwest) and imported manufactured goods. One of the most controversial aspects of U.S. economic policy in the decades after the Civil War was the use of high import tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers (located mainly in the North) from this foreign competition. Tariff advocates claimed that high import duties helped American workers by expanding industrial employment and keeping wages high, while also giving farmers a steady demand in the home market for the food and raw materials that they produced. Tariff critics charged that those import duties raised the cost of living for consumers and harmed agricultural producers by effectively taxing their exports, thus redistributing income from consumers and farmers to benefit big businesses and capital-owners in the North. This protectionist trade policy was a contentious issue in national politics during the Gilded Age of the 1880s. After post-Civil War reconstruction ended with the election compromise in 1877, both political parties sought a new issue that could be used to highlight the differences between them. Tariff policy became the major source of partisan conflict between Republicans and Democrats, with the Republicans defending high protective tariffs and the Democrats demanding the tariff only be used to raise revenue. The election of 1888 hinged on the issue of tariff reform and although the Democratic candidate (Grover Cleveland) won more popular votes, the Republican candidate (Benjamin Harrison) won the electoral college, ensuring Reitano (1994) provides a recent historical overview of tariff politics during this period. 1 De Long (1998) provides a general discussion of trade policy during this period. 2 Several industry studies examine the role of protection in promoting the iron and steel industry, such as Head (1994) on steel rails, Irwin (2000a) on pig iron, and Irwin (2000b) on the tin plate, but few papers focus on the economy-wide impact of the policy.
that the Republican policy of high tariffs remained intact. 1 Despite the political controversy and the fact that import tariffs were among the most important government policies of the period, little research has been devoted to the overall economic consequences of late nineteenth century trade protection. Many questions about the 2 economic impact of high tariffs remain unanswered, in particular that of tariff incidence: how much did import-competing producers benefit from protectionist policies and who paid the price?
Standard indicators of trade policy fall short of addressing this issue. Nominal rates of protection reveal nothing about the distributive effects of the tariff because its incidence can be shifted onto other sectors of the economy and effective rates of protection do not necessarily indicate the magnitude (or even the direction) of the underlying incentive to shift resources into importcompeting industries. This paper explores the incidence of U.S. tariff policy in the late nineteenth century by focusing on how the policy changed the domestic prices of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. A tariff increases the domestic price of importable goods relative to exportable goods, but this positive effect for import-competing industries is often mitigated by a tariff-induced increase in the price of non-tradeable goods. The rise in the price of non-traded goods also reduces the relative price of exportables to the detriment of that sector. Because of the higher prices of non-traded goods, I find that the average 30 percent U.S. tariff on imports during the 1880s yielded about a 17 percent implicit subsidy to domestic import-competing producers and amounted to a 10 percent effective tax on exports. The tariff also redistributed a large share of national income (roughly 8 percent of GDP) among various affected groups, but the impact on consumers was only slightly negative because of the large share of exported products (particularly food) in consumer expenditures.
These findings help resolve several puzzles about late nineteenth century U.S. trade policy. First, the results explain why domestic manufacturers pressed for ever higher duties, even though nominal tariff rates were already very high. The reason could be that the effective subsidy to them was much smaller than suggested by nominal rates of protection. Second, the results confirm that tariffs were a highly charged political issue for good reason: they redistributed large amounts of income between various groups. In particular, about thirty to forty percent of the burden of high tariffs fell on producers of agricultural exports, which helps account for the opposition of farmers to the existing levels of import taxation. Third, most voters may not have been strongly opposed to the protectionist policy because that policy may have been only slightly harmful to consumers overall. Section 2 of the paper sets out the economic framework that underlies the concept of "net" protection in contrast to the more familiar concepts of nominal and effective rates of protection. Section 3 examines the empirical relationship between the prices of traded and nontraded goods to determine the degree of protection (positive or negative) given to different sectors of the economy. The results also reveal the income transfers between various groups (consumers, exporters, import-competing producers, etc.) for 1879 and 1899. Section 4 applies this framework to the antebellum period to provide a contrast with the results from the late nineteenth century and to compare the results to other studies of the pre-Civil War period, such as Harley (1992) . Section 5 concludes by discussing how these findings improve our understanding of U.S. trade policy during this period.
Assessing the Degree of Trade Protection
The degree to which an import-competing sector of the economy is protected from foreign competition is a deceptively complex question. The first step in addressing this question is to examine nominal rates of protection. In the late nineteenth century, import tariffs were the sole form of U.S. trade intervention (subsidies and quotas were not employed until later in the twentieth century). The nominal rates of protection are the rates of import duty as set by
Congress and applied at the border by customs officials. Table 1 shows the average import tariffs with respect to the major import-competing sectors of the economy in 1879, 1889, and 1899. Because the United States was a net exporter of agricultural goods and a net importer of manufactured goods for most of this period, tariffs were imposed mainly on imported manufactured goods and consumption items. The rates of most import duties were very stable over the period from 1870 to 1913. The average tariff on total imports was about 30 percent and the average tariff on dutiable imports was about 30 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series U211-212). The distinction between dutiable and nondutiable imports is important because about one-third of U.S. imports during this time entered the country duty-free, largely because they were goods that did not compete with domestic producers, such as coffee and tea, raw silk and certain hides, India rubber, and tropical fruits such as bananas.
Nominal rates of protection do not necessarily indicate the actual degree of protection given to domestic producers. One problem with nominal rates is that they ignore the structure of protection across industries. The effective rate of protection, defined as the percentage change in -5-This is a general conclusion from numerous studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a more recent discussion, see Anderson (1998) .
value added in an activity as a result of the tariff structure, takes into account the impact of tariffs on intermediate and final goods in determining the degree to which producers of final goods are protected (Corden 1971) . Low tariffs on intermediate goods combined with high tariffs on final goods can result in very high effective rates of protection for final goods.
This tendency is evident in the late nineteenth century U.S. tariff code. As Table 1 indicates, tariffs on unprocessed raw materials (such as flax and wool) were set lower than duties on final manufactured goods. For example, the duty on unmanufactured wool was about 33 percent, while the duty on manufactured wool products was about 67 percent. According to Hawke's (1975) calculations, the effective rate of protection given to domestic wool manufacturers was 229 percent in 1889. Indeed, his study confirms that, for most U.S. industries during this period, the escalation of the tariff with the level of processing led to much higher effective rates of protection than indicated by the nominal rate of protection. However, a critical shortcoming of the effective rate of protection is that it does not necessarily reflect the magnitude (or even the direction) of the underlying incentive to shift resources into import-competing industries.
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A third measure of protection takes the price of non-traded goods as a numeraire against which one can determine the degree of assistance given to import-competing producers and the size of the burden placed upon export-oriented producers. The "net" or "true" rate of protection is defined as the proportionate change in the domestic price of importables relative to non--6- Corden (1971, pp. 106ff ) calls this measure "net" protection while Clement and 4 Sjaastad (1984) call it "true" protection. See Greenaway and Milner (1993) for a fuller discussion of the concept, which is often examined in the context of developing countries but has yet to be applied to the United States. tradeable goods. Taking McDougall's (1966) and Dornbusch's (1974) work on tariffs and 4 non-traded goods as a point of departure, Sjaastad (1980) and others have shown how a tariff leads to excess demand for non-traded goods, resulting in an increase in their price and an appreciation of the real exchange rate (a decline in the price of traded relative to non-traded goods) as part of the international adjustment mechanism.
To illustrate the concept, consider a small open economy that produces exportables, importables, and non-traded goods. The prices of the traded goods are determined on the world market (the terms of trade), but the prices of the non-traded goods depend on domestic supply and demand. (Thus, there are three relative prices, the terms of trade and the prices of exportables and importables in terms of the non-tradeables.) The imposition of an import tariff raises the domestic price of importables relative to exportables and, initially, relative to non-traded goods as well. This higher price shifts resources into the production of importables and out of the production of exportables and non-tradeables. It also shifts demand away from importables toward exportables and non-traded goods. The increased demand for and reduced supply of non-traded goods increases the price of non-traded goods in terms of exported goods and mitigates the increase in price of importables relative to non-traded goods.
These price changes are a necessary part of the international adjustment mechanism. An increase in the tariff reduces imports, leading to an incipient balance of trade surplus and excess demand for non-tradeables. An appreciation of the real exchange rate (that is, an increase in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods) is required to restore balanced trade and eliminate the excess demand. Because of the higher price of non-tradeables, the magnitude of protection given to domestic producers of import-competing goods is less than that indicated by the nominal tariff rate. In addition, producers of exportables face a decline in their price relative to that of non-tradeables.
In this framework, the net or true rate of protection is defined as the proportionate change in the domestic price of importables relative to non-tradeables. The tariff increases the domestic price of importables by (1+t), where t is the ad valorem tariff rate, which in turn increases the domestic price of non-tradeables by (1+d), where d is the percentage increase in the price of non-MN traded goods. As a result, the net protection to the importables sector is t* = Ä(P /P ) = (1+t)/(1+d) -1 or
Similarly, the net subsidy to the exportables sector is
where s is the rate of export subsidy granted by the government. If s = 0, as in the late nineteenth century, then s* reduces to -d/(1+d), which will be negative (i.e., an export tax).
For example, suppose that a 50 percent import tariff leads to a 20 percent increase in the price of non-traded goods. This means that the net subsidy to import-competing producers as a result of the tariff (as measured by the increase in the price of importables relative to non-traded goods) is 25 percent, while the net tax imposed on exporters (as measured by the decline in the price of exportables relative to non-tradeables) is 17 percent. If the price of non-traded goods had risen by the full amount of the tariff, then the import-competing sector would have received no protection since its relative price would not have increased.
As is often the case in tax policy, policy makers can choose the nominal rate of -8-
Specifically, ù = (h -h )/(h -h ), where h and h and the compensated demand
and supply price elasticities for non-traded goods with respect to the price of import-competing goods and non-traded goods, in compliance with homogeneity restrictions. See Greenaway and Milner (1993, pp. 120-121) for further details.
protection, but cannot directly control the incidence of the tariff because they cannot influence how much it drives up the price of non-traded goods. In terms of incidence, in the example just considered, only 60 percent of the nominal protection actually reaches import-competing producers as a subsidy, while 40 percent of the nominal protection falls on exporters as an effective export tax. Only if the tariff has no impact on non-traded goods prices will the nominal rate of protection translate into assistance of the same magnitude for import-competing producers.
Furthermore, the following equilibrium relationship can be shown to hold:
where P is the price of non-traded goods, P is the price of importables, P is the price of XX exportables, a ^ indicates the proportion rate of change (e.g., ÄP /P ). The incidence or shift parameter ù is a function of the compensated demand and supply price elasticities for nontradeables with respect to the three prices. This incidence or shift parameter ù summarizes the 5 general equilibrium relationship between the prices of traded and non-traded goods and indicates the degree to which importables and non-tradeables are substitutes in production and consumption. In general, ù falls between zero and one and indicates the fraction of the increase in the price of importables (with a tariff) that spills over and increases the price of nontradeables. When ù is zero, there is no change in the price of non-tradeables as a result of the tariff and hence the price of import-competing goods rises by the amount of nominal protection.
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As ù approaches one, in which case ÄP /P will be close to ÄP /P , implying that importcompeting and non-traded goods are close substitutes in production and consumption, there will be little net protection of importables relative to non-tradeables.
If import tariffs are the only form of trade intervention, such that there are no export XX subsidies and therefore ÄP /P = 0, then from equation (2) we have:
Combining equations (1) and (2N) yields
In this equation, the net or true rate of protection hinges on the nominal rate of tariff protection (t) and the incidence parameter (ù). Since 0 # ù # 1, the nominal rate of protection overstates the true degree of protection (t $ t* $0). If ù = 0, then t* = t, but as ù approaches one, then t* approaches zero.
The incidence parameter ù also indicates the proportion of the tariff that is borne on exporters as an implicit export tax. Assuming again that there are no export subsidies, then combining equations (1N) and (2N) yields (3N) s* = -ùt/(1 + ùt).
If ù = 0, then the price of exportables in terms of non-tradeables does not change and exporters do not suffer (i.e., s* = 0), but if ù > 0, then s* < 0. In the limit, if ù = 1, then the price of exportables relative to non-tradeables falls by the full extent of the tariff and a nominal tariff of a given amount acts as an export tax of the same amount. Thus, if the tariff has a large impact on the price of non-traded goods, the tariff simultaneously yields a low level of protection for import-competing producers while imposing a great cost on exporters. The magnitude of the increase in price of non-tradeables is determined by the degree of substitutability between non-tradeables and importables in production and consumption. If there is substitutability between nontraded and traded goods, then HH is negatively sloped. Figure 1 6 also depicts two extreme cases. If importables and non-tradeables are perfect substitutes in production and consumption (ù = 1), the HH schedule is horizontal, the price of non-tradeables increases by the full extent of the tariff, and the final equilibrium is at C. In this case, the importcompeting sector receives no protection, because its relative price did not increase, and the burden of the tariff falls entirely on producers of exportables, whose price falls relative to nontradeables by 1/(1+t). This nominal tariff is a pure export tax with no protection for importcompeting producers relative to non-tradeables.
Alternatively, if exportables and non-tradeables are close substitutes (ù = 0), the HH schedule is vertical, the price of non-tradeables does not change, and the final equilibrium is at D. In this case, the nominal tariff equals the net or true protection given to import-competing producers. The price of exportables falls relative to importables, but not relative to non-traded goods.
This framework is a useful way of thinking about the late nineteenth century American economy for several reasons. First, the U.S. economy at this time can be viewed as being comprised of three sectors, producing agricultural goods (exportables), manufactured goods (importables), and non-traded goods (services). These sectors were roughly balanced in terms of size: in 1879, agriculture and mining accounted for 33 percent of GDP, manufacturing about 23 percent of GDP, and services roughly 44 percent of GDP (Gallman 1960, Gallman and Weiss 1969) . Any analysis that goes beyond a simple two-sector tradeoff between the export and import-competing sectors and brings into account another large segment of the economy (the non-traded services sector) is therefore historically relevant.
Second, the impact of protection in raising the price of non-traded goods and inflating the cost structure of the economy is not only commonly recognized today, but was frequently mentioned in the late nineteenth century. The imposition of high trade barriers to protect a large segment of the economy could not help but to have an impact on the non-traded sector of the Contemporary economists such as Taussig (1906) described the various mechanisms by 7 which high tariffs kept the level of U.S. wages and prices higher than they would otherwise be.
economy as well. Many observers recognized that increased production in import-competing industries as a result of the tariff would create demands on resources that would increase production costs and thereby mitigate the gains to domestic producers of import-competing goods while adversely affecting exporters. The Special Commissioner for Revenue, David Wells (1867, p. 37) , wrote in his first report that a high import tariff "will soon distribute itself throughout the whole community, and will eventually manifest itself and reappear in the shape of an increased price for all other forms of labor and commodities; thus aggravating the very evil which in the outset it was intended to remedy." And William Grosvenor (1871, p. 359) noted:
"A duty on one article may not affect at all the cost of producing others. But duties on three thousand articles, each duty being diffused in its effect through a whole community, must have some power to increase the cost of producing every thing, and thus must not only tend to neutralize every benefit contemplated, but to put even our natural industries at a disadvantage." 7 Third, changes in the real exchange rate were an important part of the international adjustment mechanism in the late nineteenth century. In response to a higher tariff, an alternative adjustment would be a nominal exchange rate appreciation, which would also lower the relative price of tradeables. In the late nineteenth century, however, the United States was on a metallic monetary (gold) standard for much of the period and so nominal exchange rate changes were ruled out. Instead, changes in the domestic price level, i.e., the price of non-tradeables, were required to remove the excess demand for non-traded goods and to restore
For a recent study on commercial policy, the real exchange rate, and non-traded goods 8 that uses an approach similar to the one in this paper, see Devereux and Connolly (1996) .
It is also equivalent to estimating log (P ) = á + ù log (P ) + (1 -ù) log (P ) + å , 9 the trade balance to its previous level. 
Measuring Net Protection and Tariff Incidence
Like the concepts of nominal and effective protection, the net or true rate of protection can be explored with some simple calculations. Because the incidence parameter ù is determined by a complex structure of substitution relationships, a common strategy is to estimate it indirectly by rearranging equation (2) as follows: (4) , and estimating
where ù is the elasticity of P /P with respect to P /P and å is an error term. This regression relies on the fact that the terms of trade are determined by the world market while the prices of non-traded goods are endogenous.
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This equation focuses on how changes in the relative price of imports (as depicted by a rotation of the ray in Figure 1 ) affect the relative price of non-tradeables, but excludes anything that might change the price of domestic non-traded goods without necessarily changing the price of imports or exports. That is, it does not account for factors that might shift the HH schedule itself. A plausible shift variable for domestic prices (the HH schedule) is the domestic money stock, or currency held by the public, relative to nominal GDP. This is a measure of inflationary pressures, as changes in the money supply might bring about changes in domestic prices beyond those induced by changes in the prices of traded goods. Therefore, equation (5) can be modified as follows:
N Xt M Xt Xt t (5N) log (P /P ) = á + ù log (P /P ) + â log (M/P ) +å , where M is the domestic monetary stock relative to nominal GDP.
This method of estimating ù has the advantage of requiring only time series data on export and import prices, the price of non-tradeables, and the money supply. Lipsey (1963) calculates export and import prices starting in 1879, as presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census One concern about this specification is that the results from a regression based on equation (5) cannot reject the hypothesis that log (P /P ) and log (P /P ) using either the GDP deflator or CPI have a unit root in levels (i.e., are nonstationary), while one can reject that hypothesis in first difference (i.e., the series are stationary when differenced). Estimation of equation (5) and (5N) in levels might be appropriate if the non-stationary series are cointegrated, i.e., that there is a longrun equilibrium relationship between the two such that a linear combination of them is stationary; otherwise, they should be estimated in first differences to ensure that the regressors are stationary. regressions suggest that log (P /P ) and log (P /P ) are not cointegrated. Using the Engle- One concern with these estimates is that the structure of U.S. trade underwent a dramatic Using equations (3) and (3N), the estimates of ù that the nominal rate of protection of 30 percent translates into a 15 percent degree of net protection given to import-competing producers (manufacturing) and amounts to an 12 percent effective tax on exporters (agriculture) in the case Of course, import-competing interests always have an interest in higher tariffs, but the 10 marginal benefit of higher tariffs may diminish after some point. If the net protection is much lower than the nominal protection, however, the high nominal protection may understate the incentives to seek higher tariffs. This phenomena may account for the push by manufacturing interests for even higher rates of nominal protection in the McKinley tariff of 1890.
of the high ù, and a 19 percent degree of net protection and 9 percent export tax in the case of the low ù. As expected, import tariffs were not nearly as protective as indicated by nominal or effective rates of protection and the burden imposed on the exportables sector was significant.
These results have implications that help explain several well-known features of the nineteenth century debate over tariff policy. The advantages effectively gained by the importcompeting producers, as compared to non-traded goods producers, was much lower than might be deduced from the nominal rates of protection. Just as agricultural subsidies in the twentieth century get capitalized into land values and the prices of other inputs, thereby raising farmers' costs, the import tariffs of the late nineteenth century put upward pressure on producers' costs by increasing nominal wages and the prices of non-traded goods. As a result, import-competing interests had an incentive to press for even higher tariffs to gain greater protection.
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The results also indicate that exporters faced a substantial export tax, on the order of about 10 percent. The term ù indicates the fraction of protection that is borne by exporters, meaning that about thirty to forty percent of whatever nominal import tariffs were imposed resulted in a higher price of non-traded goods with no compensating change in the price of exportable goods. Although the Constitution formally prohibited export taxes, agriculture faced a large, implicit export tax as a result of the import tariffs of the day. The implicit export tax hit a broad constituency because agricultural exports were quite diverse in the late nineteenth century, encompassing traditional staples such as cotton and tobacco produced in the South, as
Although a fully specified, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model might 11 yield more precise accounting of changes in income distribution, previous research has found that this framework yields findings similar to those more complex simulations without the detailed data requirements. See Choi and Cumming (1986) .
Some adjustments were made to these data. In 1879, exportables include agriculture, 12 mining, and related manufactures (flour and grist mill products, slaughtering and meat packing, cheese, butter and milk products); importables include manufacturing (excluding those in exportables), and non-tradeables include construction and services. In 1899, exportables include agriculture, mining, and related manufactures (food and kindred products, iron and steel manufactures, lumber and wood manufactures), and non-tradeables include construction and services. I thank Thomas Weiss for suggesting that such an adjustment should be made.
well as grains and meat products produced in many states across the Midwest. This feature of protection may account for the general opposition of Midwestern farmers and Southern planters to the high level of the tariff.
The framework developed above can also reveal the income transfers associated with this incidence of protection (Clement and Sjaastad 1984, Choi and Cumming 1986) . Table 3 11 presents data on the structure of the economy that is required to calculate the income transfers between various groups. Because of change in the structure of the U.S. economy and trade over this period, two years (1879 and 1899) are taken as benchmarks. In general, exportable production is the fraction of GDP accounted for by agriculture and mining, while importables production is manufacturing as a share of GDP (taken from Gallman (1960) and Gallman and Weiss (1969) ), although these have been adjusted to reflect U.S. trade at the time.
12 Table 5 presents an intersectoral transfer matrix that records the implied income transfers among five groups -import-competing producers, exporters, consumers, taxpayers, and the government -as a result of the tariff policy in 1879. The redistribution of income is calculated under the assumption of that the policy does not change total income and results are presented for
The framework employed in this paper is not equipped to examine the deadweight 13 losses from the tariff policy. The net welfare impact (or the static deadweight loss) from trade protection would probably be very small, perhaps just a percentage point of GDP. Even if the United States had no tariffs, the share of trade in GDP would have been relatively small given the large size of the U.S. economy. In addition, protection did not create many grossly inefficient import-competing industries because free trade within the large U.S. market ensured vigorous competition among domestic producers. Using an applied general equilibrium model of the antebellum U.S. economy, Harley (1992) calculates that the aggregate welfare loss associated with the tariff in 1859 was less than one percent of GDP. Like the results presented below, this small net loss masked significant amounts of redistribution.
the high and low estimates of the incidence parameter. These results indicate that trade 13 protection was responsible for reshuffling almost 9 percent of GDP between various agents in the economy. The implicit export tax accompanying the policy of import protection imposed a cost X on exporters -measured as ùt*q /(1-ù) -that ranged from 2.7 percent to 3.7 percent of GDP, depending on the high or low estimate of ù. Meanwhile, the tariff forced consumers to pay between 3.6 and 4.7 percent of GDP in terms of higher prices on importables, with 2.9 to 3.7 M percent of GDP going to import-competing producers (t*q ) and about 0.7 percent of GDP going to the government (t*m) in customs duties. Turning to the beneficiaries, import-competing industries gained 3.2 to 3.7 percent of GDP from consumers, while consumers gained the equivalent of about 2.2 percent of GDP at the expense of exporters by virtue of the lower prices of exportables. The government collected a total of about 1.6 percent of GDP in customs revenue, which -by assumption -was returned directly to taxpayers.
The most interesting question that the transfer matrix can address is whether consumers benefitted or lost from protection. Consumers gain from the lower domestic price of exportables X (by the amount ùt*c /(1-ù)) but lose from the higher domestic price of importables (by the M amount t*c ). This gives rise to the "neoclassical ambiguity" of the standard specific factors trade model (analyzed by Ruffin and Jones 1977) wherein the change in the real wage as a result
Various consumer expenditure surveys of the 1870s and 1880s indicate budget shares 14 of about 42 percent for food, 10 percent for tobacco and alcohol, 18 percent for housing, 20 percent for clothing, and 10 percent for other items (Ward and Devereux 2003, p. 833) .
of the tariff hinges on the weights of goods in the consumption bundle. In this case, the MM X condition for consumers to gain from protection is ù > c /(c + c ), i.e., when the incidence parameter is greater than the share of importables in the consumption of tradeables. Thus, consumers stand a chance of gaining from tariffs when domestic consumption of exportables is large.
The results here indicate that consumers lost income as a result of protection, but not a substantial amount. As the table indicates, consumers gained between 2.1 and 2.9 percent of GDP at the expense of exporters but paid 2.9 to 3.7 percent of GDP to import-competing producers (about 0.8 percent of GDP sent to the government in the form of tariff revenue is presumed to be returned to all consumers in a lump-sum payment). Thus, tariff protection cost consumers on net less than one percent of GDP. The reason import duties did not put a huge burden on consumers is that about 40 percent of consumption expenditures were devoted to food, and food accounted for more than half of U.S. exports in the mid-1880s. (After cotton, breadstuffs and meat were the largest categories of U.S. exports.) Although these products were important exports, most domestic production was consumed at home; for example, about three quarters of the wheat crop was for domestic consumption. About 20 percent of consumer expenditures went to clothing, the major importable in the consumption bundle, and another 10 percent was devoted to tobacco manufactures and alcohol, both of which were imported to some degree. Thus, as Table 4 indicates, the consumption of importables as a share of GDP exceeded 14 that of exportables, but consumer spending was not highly skewed toward expenditures on Of course, either a different trade pattern or a different consumption pattern would 15 have produced a different result in terms of the impact on consumers. Consumers in Britain, like those in the United States, devoted a large share of their expenditures to food, but consumers had a strong interest in free trade because the country was a net food importer during the nineteenth century.
This assumption does not, strictly speaking, hold because the revenues from the import 16 duties were largely redistributed to specific groups, such as Civil War veterans in the North.
importables.
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Even if the net effect of protection on consumers was negative, consumers-cum-taxpayers could have gained from protection on the assumption that all the revenues from import duties (some of which are paid by exporters, not just consumers) were returned to consumers as a lumpsum rebate or exchanged for lower domestic taxes financing public goods. Consumers-cum-16 taxpayers gain whenever the shift parameter exceeds the share of production of importables in MM X the total production of tradeables, i.e., ù > q /(q + q ), a condition that does not quite hold. Table 4 indicates that consumers lost 4.1 percent of GDP as a result of protection but gained 3.9
in government transfers, amounting to a net loss of just 0.2 percent of GDP. Thus, the overall effect of tariff protection on consumers as taxpayers was roughly neutral. If the impact of tariffs on consumers as a broad class (and not in their role as producers), was roughly neutral by 1899, it would have been difficult to mobilize them to oppose the policy.
In fact, in the 1888 presidential election fought largely over the tariff issue, the voting electorate was closely divided but slightly in favor of the tariff-reform candidate. The incumbent 
An Antebellum Comparison
An advantage of the net protection framework used in this paper is that the data 18 requirements and modeling assumptions are much less severe than in computable general equilibrium models, although the results are also much less detailed.
Most studies find much higher estimates of ù for countries where traditional exports 19 dominate. In the late nineteenth century, the U.S. export bundle was a mix of traditional and non-traditional exports, and hence ù should be lower.
Although this paper has focused on the impact of the tariff in the late nineteenth century United States, this framework can also be used to shed some light on the antebellum period.
Given the sharp political conflicts between the North and the South over tariff policy, the connections between the tariff and income distribution prior to the Civil War has long been of interest to economic historians. Pope (1972) , James (1986), and Harley (1992) all employed computable general equilibrium models of varying degrees of sophistication to examine the impact of the tariff prior to the Civil War (specifically, in 1859, in the case of James and Harley).
The framework of net protection provides a much simpler, but also much less detailed, approach to the questions posed in those models. Two key differences promise to make the 18 results dissimilar to the late nineteenth century. First, the incidence parameter ù is expected to be higher in the antebellum period. As ù also represents the degree of substitutability between traded and non-traded goods, a value closer to one than to zero implies somewhat more substitutability between importables and non-tradeables than between exportables and nontradeables. In the antebellum period, exports consisted largely of cotton and tobacco produced on Southern plantations, and the concentration of exports in traditional goods (i.e., raw material or natural resource intensive primary products) are typically less substitutable with nontradeables than are importables and non-tradeables. Second, the structure of the antebellum 19 U.S. economy was quite different from that in the late nineteenth century. Although exports and imports as a percent of GDP were comparable, production of exportables (agriculture) was a larger and production of importables (manufactures) was a smaller part of the economy.
The results for the antebellum period will be presented very briefly. Export and import prices are from North (1966) , the money stock is from Temin (1969) , and the GDP deflator is taken from Johnston and Williamson (2005) and the consumer price index from David and Solar MX (1977) . Like the findings in the previous section, the three variables -log (P /P ) and log NX (P /P ) using either the GDP deflator or the CPI -are nonstationary in levels but are stationary in first differences for the period 1815 to 1860. (These results are not reported but are available NX upon request.) Like the post bellum period, the levels regressions suggest that log (P /P ) and MX log (P /P ) are not cointegrated and hence those regression results are not consistent.
In the first-difference regressions, both the regressors and the residuals are stationary. In the first-difference estimate of equation (5N), the point estimates of ù are 0.65 (with a standard error of 0.06) using the GDP deflator and 0.78 (with a standard error of 0.08) using the consumer price index. Taking a rough estimate of ù as 0.70 along with an average tariff on all imports of 20 percent in late 1850s, equation (2N) indicates that this tariff would push up the price of non-tradeables by 14 percent. This implies that the net protection given to import-competing producers (manufacturing) was just 5 percent and the effective tax on exporters (agriculture) was 12 percent. The higher estimate of ù implies a large impact on the price of non-traded goods and reaffirms Southerner complaints that the burden of the tariff was largely shifted onto Southern exporters through higher prices of importables and non-traded goods. Table 6 presents the structure of the economy in 1859 and Table 7 presents the implied -25-Due to the availability of greater data, previous work, such as Pope, James, and Harley, 20 cited above, also focused on the late antebellum period even though the most contentious debates over the tariff were in the 1820s and early 1830s.
The most transparent transfer for which other data can be used to assess the validity of 21 the transfer magnitudes is that from the government to taxpayers. Around 1850, the government collected about $40 to $50 million in tariff revenue, about 1.5 percent of GDP at that time, taking nominal GDP as about $2.4 billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series U-210). This is reasonably close to the 1.0 percent of GDP indicated in these calculations.
transfers. Three differences stand out in comparison to the late nineteenth century period.
20
First, the magnitude of the total transfers was less in the antebellum period, perhaps because the average tariff (after the early 1830s) was lower than in the Gilded Age. Second, despite that, transfers from exporters were greater in the antebellum period than later. The greater resources squeezed from exporters combined with a greater commodity and geographic concentration of those exporters in the South made the tariff even more controversial in the antebellum period.
Third, unlike the later period, consumers in the antebellum period appear to gain from the tariff because domestic consumption of exportables (agriculture) was greater while consumption of importables (manufactures) was lower as a percent of GDP. These results may be somewhat 21 misleading in that the major exportables were cotton and tobacco, and at least the former was not directly purchased by consumer households but by textile firms in the North.
The Table 7 results can be compared with those in Harley's (1992) general equilibrium calculations (in his tables 4 and 7). Perhaps because the categories are not exactly comparable, the similarity in the results is mixed. Harley finds a much smaller positive impact of the tariff on the price of non-traded goods, only about three to six percent, as opposed to the 14 percent here.
He also estimates that labor as a whole loses a small amount (about 0.5 percent) from the tariff whereas a non-trivial gain to consumers is estimated here (about 2 percent of GDP). This difference may be due to the different assumptions about the consumption bundle, as households
were not the direct consumers of exportables such as cotton. However, Harley's estimate of the tariff's burden on farmers and planters is close to that found here; he estimates a loss of about two to three percent of GDP for farmers and planters (exporters) while the results here indicate it is about four percent. His gains to capital (an import-competing factor) are only about 0.4 percent of GDP whereas here they amount to about one percent of GDP.
Conclusions
This paper examined the issue of tariff incidence in the late nineteenth century United
States. Several findings give us insight into some of the important features of American trade politics in the late nineteenth century. First, although the nominal level of protection was very high to judge by legislated tariff rates, the net protection given to import-competing manufacturers was diminished by the tariff-induced increase in the price of non-traded goods.
The calculations presented here suggest that the 30 percent average tariff on total imports resulted in net protection of just 15 percent for import-competing producers (manufacturers) and an export tax of 11 percent on export-oriented producers (agriculture). This low level of net protection gave these manufacturers an ongoing incentive to press for higher duties to increase their level of support.
Second, the tariff redistributed substantial amounts of income among various producer groups and consumers. In addition, the burden of the tariff on exporters exceeded the benefits received by import-competing producers. The sizeable redistribution brought about by the protectionist trade policy justified its status as one of the most highly controversial issues in national political during this period. Both the desirability and the efficiency of the transfers were leading political issues.
Third, the policy of tariff protection appears to have been negative with respect to consumers but roughly neutral with respect to consumers as taxpayers. Consumers did not bear an enormous burden from the high tariff rates because of the large weight on exportable goods (principally food) in domestic consumer expenditures. The political implication was that tariff opponents would not be able to generate much support for their position by appealing to consumer interests, and in fact the pro-tariff Republicans dominated national politics for many decades after the Civil War.
Fourth, in the antebellum period, the incidence of the tariff was higher on the exportables sector. Although the total transfers as a result of the tariff were lower than in the late nineteenth century, the cost to the exportables sector was greater than in the post bellum period. Because the production of export crops was highly concentrated in the South, states such as South Carolina vehemently argued that the tariff was a sectional policy, making trade policy even more politically divisive than in the late nineteenth century. Source: In 1879, exportables include agriculture, mining, and related manufactures (flour and grist mill products, slaughtering and meat packing, cheese, butter and milk products); importables include manufacturing (excluding those in exportables), and non-tradeables includes construction and services. In 1899, exportables include agriculture, mining, and related manufactures (food and kindred products, iron and steel manufactures, lumber and wood manufactures), and non-tradeables include construction and services. The sectoral shares as a percent of GDP are an average of 1879 and 1889 in Gallman (1960) , Table A Note: Based on Table 3 , ù = 0.32, and t = 0.30, which yields t* = 0.19 and s* = -0.09. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. Note: Based on Table 6 , and ù = 0.70, t = 0.20, which yields t* = 0.05 and s* = -0.12. Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
